Abstract.

Public company disclosures give analysts
Disclosure requirements recently imposed by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) give investors a comprehensive measure of top management's total compensation, but do not provide a comprehensive measure of management's incentive to increase shareholder value. In this article, we present two comprehensive incentive measures: the sensitivity of management wealth to changes in shareholder wealth ("value wealth leverage") and the sensitivity of management wealth to changes in revenue ("revenue wealth leverage"). We show how investors can use these measures to answer four important questions:
1. How strong is management's incentive to create shareholder value?
2. How strong is management's incentive to grow revenues? 3. Does management have an incentive to pursue value-destroying revenue growth? 4. Is higher value wealth leverage (i.e., strong wealth creation incentives) associated with significant excess returns?
Percent of pay at risk: the conventional way to think about incentives Exhibit 1 shows the 2006 total compensation of ExxonMobil CEO Rex Tillerson reported under the new SEC disclosure rules. The total compensation disclosure makes it fairly easy to calculate the conventional measure of incentive strength, the percent of pay that is "at risk." The only complication for Tillerson is the need to split the change in pension value into two components because the pension is based on salary and bonus. The conventional approach to executive pay is based on three premises. The first is that the percent of pay at risk is a good proxy for incentive strength and hence, an executive who has a high percent of pay tied to market and operating measures of shareholder value, like Tillerson, has a strong incentive to create shareholder value. The second premise is that recalibrating total compensation each year to achieve a competitive position target, e.g., 50 th percentile pay among an executive's peer group, will ensure that pay is sufficient to attract and retain key talent. The third premise is that setting the competitive position target at or close to median pay levels will ensure that the shareholder cost of management compensation is reasonable.
In the conventional view, a high percent of pay at risk and a 50 th percentile competitive position target achieves all three of these basic objectives.
In this article, we argue that there are serious flaws in the conventional approach. First, percent of pay at risk is not a good measure of incentive strength, as we demonstrate below. Second, a fixed competitive position target is not a sensible retention objective. It is not needed to retain poor performers, and is likely insufficient to retain superior performers. It also creates a strong incentive for value-destroying growth that threatens to neutralize the incentive provided by management's stock and option holdings. Fourth, a competitive position target is not a complete measure of shareholder cost. The goal of incentive plans should be to improve performance. The conventional approach measures the cost, but not the benefit, of incentive compensation.
Wealth leverage: a better way to think about incentives
A better analysis of executive pay starts with the premise that executives, like investors, are motivated by expected changes in wealth, not by changes in annual pay. Our definition of executive wealth is:
• the current value of company stock and stock options, plus
• the present value of expected future compensation, which includes salary, bonuses, stock and option grants, and pensions.
We express the return on this wealth as follows: 
Estimating wealth leverage for public companies
The conventional approach to pay -annual re-calibration to a target competitive position -makes future compensation independent of current value performance. A realistic analysis of value-destroying growth incentives should start with an estimate of feasible revenue growth (organically or through acquisition) and then ask if management has an incentive to pursue this growth even when it causes a material decline in shareholder wealth. Our test of whether or not there is an incentive to pursue value-destroying growth is whether management has an incentive to make an acquisition that increases revenue by 25% but reduces shareholder wealth by 15%.
With this test, Tillerson does have an incentive to pursue valuedestroying growth. The 25% revenue gain increases his wealth by 0.30 x 25% = 7.5%, while the 15% decline in shareholder wealth reduces his wealth by only 0.35 x 15% = 5.3%. To make this acquisition unattractive, Tillerson needs wealth leverage of at least 0.50. At this level of wealth leverage, the gain in wealth from the revenue gain will be exactly offset by the loss in wealth from the decline in shareholder wealth. As value wealth leverage increases even further, the incentive to reject a value destroying investment also increases. A change in value wealth leverage has a positive effect on both oneand three-year excess returns. A value wealth leverage increase of 0.1 increases the subsequent one-year return by 0.9% and the subsequent threeyear return by 2.2%. High compensation cost has a negative effect on both one-and three-year excess returns. A 10% premium over market compensation reduces the subsequent one-year return by -0.5% and the subsequent three year return by -1.4%. The samples for these regressions are 8,990 cases for one-year returns and 6,568 cases for three-year returns.
Each case is a one-or three-year return for one company. 
A note on the incentive problems behind the financial crisis
In measuring value wealth leverage, we assume that the shareholder wealth change involves no change in stock volatility. This means that a decline in the stock price always reduces the value of an executive's stock options. It is possible, however, that managers with stock options will choose strategies that increase volatility (and option value) even at the cost of a decline in shareholder value. This could be a danger in financial institutions especially because it is relatively easy for a financial institution to increase earnings volatility by acquiring assets with higher current yields but also higher probabilities of future default. For a company designing its management incentives, it is therefore vital to measure wealth leverage across a wide range of scenarios to ensure that wealth leverage does not go negative when volatility is increasing and shareholder wealth is decreasing.
Interestingly, we find little evidence that top management incentives to take excessive risk, i.e., to increase volatility at the expense of shareholder value, were a contributing factor to the financial crisis. Even if we assume a huge increase in volatility (0.15 to 0.70) and a modest stock price decline (-25%), the CEOs of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers had no incentive to increase volatility at the expense of shareholder value because the gain on their options was more than offset by the loss on their stock holdings.
But business unit incentives to take excessive risk may have contributed to the collapse. If business unit managers are given a fixed percentage of business unit profit, but do not share in losses, they will have an incentive to acquire higher yielding assets with higher default probabilities even when the expected value of the assets to the shareholders is negative.
The problem is particularly acute when managers are building up a new business because there are few current period default losses on older assets to offset the benefit of the high yields on newer assets. In these situations, the managers have negative wealth leverage because their wealth increases when shareholder wealth declines. The value wealth leverage of the options is the percentage change in the Black-Scholes value divided by the 25% change in the stock price. Tillerson's option leverage is higher than the median option leverage for all S&P 1500 executives (1.6) because ExxonMobil has low stock volatility and a high dividend yield. Since a number of option features (low stock volatility, high dividend yield, a low ratio of market price to exercise price and a short option term) can produce very high leverages that are unlikely to have a proportional effect on managerial motivation, we truncate option leverage at 2.0 in our estimates of public company wealth leverage.
The leverage of current year incentive compensation
Current year incentive compensation includes annual bonus, new stock and option grants, new awards under multi-year cash incentive plans (what we call "performance cash" plans), new awards under multi-year performance stock plans and the change in the value of outstanding performance cash and performance stock plans. We use regressions on historical pay and performance to estimate the leverage of the annual bonus and new long-term incentive awards (i.e., restricted stock grants, stock option grants, performance stock grants and performance cash awards). Since our regressions use logarithms, we use total compensation including nonperformance pay as our dependent variable to eliminate zero pay values.
Once we estimate the leverage of total compensation, we divide by [1 -percent of pay at risk] to calculate incentive compensation leverage.
We use five years of historical data to estimate current year total compensation value leverage. For each year and for each executive in the top five, we calculate relative pay and relative performance. Relative pay is the executive's total compensation for the year divided by our estimate of market total compensation for the executive. Our estimate of market total compensation is based on a revenue trend line for the company's industry group and the executive's position (CEO) or pay rank (2-5). Relative performance is ending shareholder wealth for the company divided by ending shareholder wealth assuming the industry average return. Our initial estimate of current year pay leverage is the slope of the regression trendline relating the natural log of relative pay to the natural log of relative performance. Our final estimate combines this estimate with industry average pay leverage, as we explain below.
We use a similar approach to estimate current year total compensation revenue leverage. For each year and for each executive in the top five, we calculate relative pay and relative size. Relative pay, for the revenue leverage regressions, is the executive's total compensation for the year divided by the industry geometric mean total compensation for the executive's position or pay rank. Relative size is the company's revenue for the year divided by the industry geometric mean revenue for the executive's position or pay rank. Our estimate of revenue leverage is the slope of the regression trendline relating the natural log of relative pay to the natural log of relative size. Determining the performance year for equity compensation Our initial calculation (the "normal calculation") of total compensation for a year is the sum of non-performance pay (i.e., salary and "other" compensation which includes perquisites and non-qualified benefits), the cash bonus earned for the year (which may be paid in the following year), new performance cash awards (i.e., cash bonuses based on multi-year performance) and new equity awards (i.e., restricted stock grants, performance stock grants and stock option grants) valued at the stock or option value at the date of grant.
The leverage of future incentive compensation
However, including equity compensation in total compensation based on the date of grant can easily distort pay leverage estimates because the equity compensation may have been granted on the basis of prior year performance. When companies make equity grants early in the year, they typically reflect (to the extent performance has any impact on the equity grant amount) prior year performance. Almost all published pay for performance analyses match current year equity compensation to current year performance without making any effort to determine if grant decisions were guided by current or prior year performance. We address this problem by computing two different measures of total compensation: our normal calculation above which includes the equity grants made in the year and an alternative calculation ("total compensation -next year's equity") that drops out current year equity grants and substitutes in the next year's equity grants.
We then test, using five years of historical data for each company, which total compensation measure is more sensitive to performance. For about half of the companies, total compensation is more sensitive to performance when we use next year's equity grants. For ExxonMobil, total compensation -next year's equity is more sensitive to performance than "normal" total compensation for every five-year period in our database (i.e., for each of the nine five-year periods ending in [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] SD, but below the adjusted industry pay leverage -1 SD, we assign the company pay leverage of the adjusted industry pay leverage -1 SD. If none of these conditions hold, we assign the company pay leverage equal to the adjusted industry pay leverage.
Estimating the present value of expected future compensation
Once we get current-and future-year pay leverages for a company, we can calculate a weighted average of these pay leverages to get the wealth leverage of the present value of expected future compensation for each executive. The weight for each year's pay leverage is the percentage of the present value of expected future compensation attributable to that year. Our estimate of the present value of expected future compensation starts with an estimate of normalized total compensation for the current year. That estimate is equal to current base salary times one plus a three year average of each pay component as a percent of base salary. Tillerson's 2006 base salary was $1.5 million and his three year average percentages of salary were 133% for bonus, 65% for long-term incentive cash payouts, 786% for stock grants and 20% for other non-performance pay, a total of 1,004% of salary. With these percentages, his normalized total compensation for 2006 was $16.6 million.
To estimate the present value of Tillerson's expected future compensation at the end of 2006, we project his future compensation to retirement at age 65, a total of ten years from his current age of 55, and then discount it to a present value.
Our future compensation projections use normalized total compensation as a base and assume that total compensation grows at 3%
above the 20 year U.S. government bond rate. For the years 1993-2005, the median total compensation increase for the executives reported in Execucomp averaged 3.2% more than the 20 year bond rate. At year end 2006, when the 20 year bond rate was 4.9%, our projected total compensation increase was 7.9%. To discount projected future compensation, we use a 3% risk premium over the 20 year bond rate. We believe that a low risk premium is appropriate because there is little performance risk associated with future compensation. Most companies have competitive pay policies that make future compensation opportunity independent of performance, and there is little use of fixed share grant policies that would add equity risk to future compensation opportunity.
